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1 Introduction
Since the 2006 elections, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) has been trying to
establish democratic institutions. Central to this
is the security and justice sector, with the police
at its heart. This article maps out the Congolese
state and non-state actors and international
stakeholders involved in providing and managing
police services, with particular emphasis on the
informal networks influencing decision-making
processes and policy implementation. It also
analyses the interactions between the police,
national and local actors, and citizens.
The task is challenging, due to the multiplicity of
security sector actors and the interconnectedness
of services. Nevertheless, the article provides
information on the history and organisational
structure of these services; the different actors
and networks involved in managing them; and
the impact on service quality, using a case study
of the Bas-Congo Province for illustration. 
2 Historical and legal evolution of Congolese
police services 
2.1 Evolution of the police force
To understand how the police are managed in
the DRC, it is important to consider the
country’s historical and institutional contexts.
The roles, responsibilities and interactions
between various institutions and actors linked
with the police at central, provincial and local
levels are examined, as well as the legal texts
pertaining to the country’s security. The article
highlights horizontal and vertical accountability
mechanisms within the existing legal framework,
and the legal gaps and contradictions that may
explain overlapping mandates. The reference to
legal texts demonstrates that the key resources
available to Congolese actors rest on the existing
legal framework and its loopholes, which they
know how to exploit for political gain. Crucially,
they also rest on the powerful informal networks. 
The evolution of the legal framework from 1959
to 2006 explains in part the structure of the
Police Nationale Congolaise (National Congolese
Police, PNC hereafter). The history points to the
overlap between the military and law
enforcement functions, which has prevailed since
Independence. The PNC has constantly fought to
transform itself from an institution serving one
man and his followers into a truly public service.
From 1885 to 1908, under the control of King
Leopold II of Belgium, the Etat Indépendent
Congolais (EIC, Independent Congolese State) did
not have a police force. When the country became
35
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a Belgian colony in 1908, it acquired a force publique
(public force) responsible for both the army and
the police. Its key role was to oversee the
establishment and the protection of the colony. 
After the Second World War, the colonial
government sent representatives of the force
publique and soldiers to help territorial
administrators maintain law and order in new
cities and rural areas under the control of
customary centres of power, which were becoming
increasingly more populated. This process was
important in the establishment of the police in
the Congo for two reasons: firstly, it marked the
beginning of a territorial law enforcement
service, which paved the way for provincial
governors to set up urban police forces. It also
marked the beginning of a professional trained
police force at officer level and for natives only
(all positions of leadership and command were
reserved exclusively for white people). 
The bloody repression of the events of 4 January
19591 prompted colonial authorities to create the
gendarmerie, made up of former soldiers trained as
police officers. After Independence in 1960, there
were three law enforcement structures carrying
out police interventions: the force publique, the police
urbaine (urban police) and the newly formed
gendarmerie (Ebenga and Nlandu 2005). They
played a destabilising role in a chaotic post-
Independence period marked by many riots,
secessions and armed rebellions leading up to the
military coup on 24 November 1965, which
brought General Mobutu to power. The former
urban police forces became the territorial police
forces, used as puppets by power-hungry politicians
and responsible for the country’s Balkanisation.
In July 1966, Mobutu decided to unite all police
forces within one force – the PNC – created by
presidential decree n°66/423. This reform
established a police force with one central point
of command and management, and the equal
distribution of personnel across the provincial
police, separate from the gendarmerie. The PNC
was mandated to maintain public order, ensure
public safety and salubriousness, and carry out
surveillance.2 In practice however, most police
services had the political mission of protecting
and ensuring the survival of Mobutu’s regime. 
Reunited after a long period of tribal wars, the
country became the Republic of Zaïre in 1971 and
integrated all its forces into one single force
capable of quashing any hostility against the
regime. The gendarmerie nationale was created by
presidential decree n°72/31 on 31 July 1972,
following the dissolution of the national police
force and the post-Independence gendarmerie, both
rendered inefficient due to their constant rivalry.
The gendarmerie nationale became an integral part
of the army and therefore a militarised force.3
The impoverished4 gendarmerie nationale rapidly
became an instrument of oppression. It was
replaced by the garde civile (civil guard), created
by decree-law n°84-036 on 28 August 1984,
modified and completed by decree-law 002 on 14
March 1992,5 with the same mission as the
gendarmerie nationale, but better equipped and
trained militarily. The garde civile was a kind of
anti-riot police force modelled on the German
federal police. 
During the so-called ‘war of liberation’, which
began in 1997, the l’Alliance des Forces
Démocratiques (Allied Democratic Forces, AFDL)
created a new police force (separate from the
forces still engaged in combat). Most agents in
this new force were recruited hastily and lacked
any appropriate training. The fall of Kinshasa on
17 May 1997 saw the formal establishment of
this new structure, which called upon many
experienced ex-military officers and former
members of the gendarmerie and garde civile to join
its ranks. The new police force was not enshrined
in law until the enactment of legal decrees
n°002/2002 dated 26 January 2002 (establishing
the organisation and operations of the PNC) and
n°042/2002 (instigating the visibility of ranks).
Articles 182–186 of the 2006 Congolese
Constitution (Democratic Republic of Congo
2006) also elaborate on the PNC’s functions and
mandate. 
2.2 A cycle of failed reforms? 
The set of reforms mentioned above create a
heterogeneous force made up of former officers
from various backgrounds: the force publique,
including retired officers; the colonial urban
police force; the former national police force; the
national gendarmerie; ex-militias; ex-military
personnel; the widows and orphans of deceased
police officers and both educated and illiterate
volunteers (CSRP Working Group 2009). These
ex-combatants are integrated into the police
without any military or police training.
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Further, the militarisation of the police is
sanctioned by the Constitution (Article 81), as
higher ranking officers are nominated on the
advice of the Superior Defence Council, which is
part of the army. Police officers are subject to
trial in martial courts of law (Article 156),
composed of army officials, magistrates and non-
magistrates. 
Throughout the post-Independence period, a
number of ill-conceived and politicised attempts
were made to develop a community police service
through the establishment of militia groups such
as the Corps des Volontaires de la République
(Republican Volunteer Corps, or CVR), the Forces
d’Auto-défense Populaire (People’s Self-defence
Forces, or FAP) and the Unités de Défense Locale
(Local Defence Units, or UDL). Common across
these initiatives was their inability to rid the
police of its military and oppressive nature. 
3 Stakeholders6
Both the legislative and executive branches of
government have a bearing on the way the police
are managed, with the executive often superseding
the legislative branch when it comes to security
issues. A number of non-state actors have also
emerged, including civil society organisations and
networks supported by the international
community. Whether or not they become credible
counter-powers remains to be seen. 
3.1 The executive
The executive branch of government comprises a
variety of stakeholders involved in managing
police services. These include the President, the
Minister of the Interior, the police Inspector
General, the PNC, l’Agence Nationale de
Renseignements (the National Intelligence Agency,
or ANR), the Direction Générale des Migration
(General Directorate for Migration, or DGM),
the police judiciaire des parquets (police force in
charge of criminal investigations), and the Comité
pour le Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (Committee
for the Monitoring of Police Reform, or CSRP).
3.2 The President of the Republic: institutional and
informal resources
According to Article 83 of the Constitution, the
President is the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. Articles 81.2 and 81.3 specify that
‘the President nominates, dismisses or revokes
generals and high-ranking officers within the
armed forces and the national police force,
without prejudice to any other provisions of the
Constitution’.
This constitutional framework enables the
President to control both internal and external
security mechanisms, and the police and the army
are the two main pillars of presidential power. The
President interacts with police services via the
Defence Council and through informal networks
organised around ethnic affiliation.
3.3 The Defence Council
Since the Mobutu era, the President of the
Republic was supported by the Conseil National de
Sécurité (National Security Council, or CNS).7 In
practice, the CNS oversaw all security agencies
and all national and provincial strategic services.8
In the new Constitution, the Conseil National de
Défense (National Defence Council, or CND)
supersedes the CNS. It retains the same mission,
constitution and operations as the CNS, and plays
a key role at the highest possible level in managing
internal security issues and police services. 
The Special Advisor on security9 holds an
influential position. He/she can call upon any
person to disclose any information for security
purposes. He/she has complete access to all
documents and intelligence. Presently, the Special
Advisor, as a member of one of the President’s
most influential networks, Ngbandi,10 exerts
considerable power over the security sector. 
3.4 Clans in power 
The President does not rely solely on legally
established structures but also on extremely
powerful formal and informal networks. These
networks overlap and often seek to neutralise
each other to protect vested interests. They are
notoriously difficult to identify and infiltrate.11
The most influential of these networks is l’axe
Katangais (the Katangese axis), which is
organised around ethnic affiliation. The Katanga
network claims to be the rightful successor of the
late Laurent Kabila, former President and father
of the current President. As was the case during
the Mobutu era with the Division Spéciale
Présidentielle (Special Presidential Division, or
DSP), the Katanga network also has its own
armed divisions (such as the Simba battalion,
which is controlled by the Inspector General of
Police), made up of former soldiers from north
Katanga, birthplace of the President. 
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The Katanga network is closely linked to
southern African interests in the DRC,
particularly South African and Zimbabwean
networks that have close ties to the mining
industry of Katanga and the two Kasaïs). It is
also heavily involved in managing the country’s
police services and therefore in direct
competition with the Banyamulenge-Rwandese
axis, which is extremely influential within the
defence sector. The latter is most influential in
the east of the DRC, where it exerts considerable
control, particularly in the mining industry,
through an illicit mineral extraction network in
collusion with armed groups closely linked to the
Forces Armées de la RDC (Armed Forces of the
DRC, FARDC), and the Rwandan and Tanzanian
business sectors.12
3.5 The government
According to the provisions of the Constitution,
the President and the government share the
responsibility for security and foreign affairs
(Article 91, clause 2). The government is
responsible for public administration, the armed
forces, the police, and security services. The Prime
Minister must keep the President informed of all
government activity, including matters of national
security. Since Independence, however, the Prime
Minister has been less involved in dealing with
security issues, which are solely the concern of the
President and his close circle. 
The government can call upon the Conseil
Supérieur de la Police Nationale (Superior National
Police Council, or CSPN) to help nominate police
generals and high ranking officers. It is made up
of the Prime Minister, the Minister of the
Interior and Security, the Minister of Justice, the
PNC Inspector General and provincial police
inspectors. The CSPN, as a consultative body,
remains far less influential than the CND, whose
Special Advisor has direct links to the presidency
and continues to lead on all national security and
police matters.13
3.6 The Ministry of the Interior and Security
The Minister of the Interior and Security, also
known as the deputy Prime Minister for the
Interior and Security, is responsible for all
matters pertaining to home security.14 These
roles were only created very recently (under
Kabila senior), making it difficult for ministers
in the position to assert themselves. The
Minister’s influence depends on his/her
personality and personal relationship with the
President and his networks, and is often less
important than the Special Advisor on security. 
Three key police services are nominally
accountable to the Minister of the Interior and
Security:
z The PNC, headed by an Inspector General
z The DGM
z The ANR.
3.7 The Inspector General of the PNC
The Inspector General of the PNC is the most
powerful person within the police. The Inspector
General is accountable to the Minister of the
Interior and Security, but his influence and
authority is far greater. The current Inspector
General was suspended following accusations of
involvement in the murder of Floribert Chebeya,
a Congolese human rights activist. He has
nevertheless remained very powerful.15 His
considerable influence stems from his close ties
with the President and the Katanga network. 
At national level the PNC is made up of the
following:
z Police d’Intervention Rapide (rapid intervention
police, or PIR) responsible for maintaining
order and security;
z Direction des Renseignements Généraux et Services
Spéciaux de la Police (Directorate for General
Intelligence and Special Police Services, or
DRGS), the police’s special intelligence
division, also known as special services;16
z The road traffic police, responsible for road
traffic safety and issuing penalty notices;
z The border police, responsible for ensuring
security at the country’s borders;
z The hygiene and environment police,
responsible for environmental protection. 
All of these services are deconcentrated at
provincial and local levels, via a network of police
stations (for territories and towns) or sub-
stations (at district level and for groupements).
3.8 Direction Générale des Migration (General
Directorate for Migration, or DGM)
The DGM is accountable to the Minister of the
Interior and Security. The DGM is not part of
the PNC but works in collaboration with other
security services. The PNC and the DGM often
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cross paths at the borders where they both
operate. One major difference between the two
is that the DGM is not armed. Like the PNC, the
DGM has central and provincial offices, as well
as a border police unit. 
3.9 L’Agence Nationale de Renseignements (the
National Intelligence Agency, or ANR)
The ANR falls under the remit of the Minister of
the Interior and Security. But in practice ANR
agents report directly to the President, which
could be explained by the fact that the agency’s
director is from the Katanga clan. 
ANR is responsible for national security, through
a number of preventative measures aimed at
protecting the stability and sovereignty of the
state and its institutions. As a national structure,
it covers the entire breadth of the country and is
split into central and provincial offices.
In spite of clearly defined duties, the ANR acts
like a ‘secret service’, operating according to its
own rules. It is notoriously difficult to gain access
to its detention centres. ANR agents often
replace regular police officers, criminal
investigation officers and justice system
representatives. They carry out investigations,
make arrests, seize goods, hand out fines and
detain people. They also regularly arrest civilians
for common law offences, as well as members of
the opposition and civil society. ANR is therefore
the most criticised of all security services.17
3.10 Officiers et Inspecteurs de Police Judiciaire
(Criminal Investigation Officers/Inspectors, or
OPJ/IPJ) and the Ministry of Justice 
The Ministry of Justice18 is responsible for the so-
called police des parquets (police force in charge of
prosecutions). In the DRC, a number of different
security services, not just the PNC, have a
responsibility for prosecution. OPJs and IPJs
identify, record and report criminal offences to the
Office of Public Prosecutions (Ministère Public).
They are referred to as ‘the eyes and ears’ of the
prosecution service as they operate on the ground. 
3.11 Le Comité pour le Suivi de la Réforme de la
Police (CSRP) – Police Reform Committee
In the mid-2000s, the Congolese authorities,
together with the support of the international
community, mainly the European Union (EU),
the UK Department for International
Development (DFID), and the United Nations
Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC),
paved the way for police reform within the
overall security sector reform (SSR). 
This process started in August 2004 with the
seminar on the reform and restructuring of the
police in the DRC. Supported by international
donors, but officially led by the Ministry of
Interior, the Groupe Mixte de Réflexion sur la Réforme
et la Réorganisation de la Police (Working Group on
Police Reform and Reorganisation, GMRRR or
GMR3) was created in November 2005
(GMRRR 2006). Composed of six Congolese
members and 16 international members, it was
tasked with reflecting upon and formulating
proposals on the future of the Congolese police.
The GMRRR produced a status report on the
Congolese police highlighting: the militarisation
of police services; the devolution of some police
powers to ministries other than the ministry of
security; the lack of resources; laws and
regulations that were not fit-for-purpose; and the
lack of a clear mandate for the head of the PNC,
who has no real disciplinary powers. 
The GMRRR was tasked with drafting an organic
law to supersede the 2002 decree on the
organisation and operations of the police. The
draft defined the new police service as ‘a national
public service, which is accessible, responsive to
the population’s needs, civil, professional,
unique, apolitical, answerable to civilian
authorities, respectful of human rights, and
national, regional and international legal
instruments’. It included the reorganisation of
territorial units in order to ‘respond to citizens’
needs for peace and tranquillity’, and the
creation of a police de proximité (community
policing, or PdP). The government approved the
draft organic law in May 2009. The GMRRR was
also tasked with forming the CSRP, which was
formerly launched in September 2007. 
Headed by the Minister of the Interior and
Security, the political arm of the CSRP leads on
policy development. It also includes the Ministry
of National Defence and Ex-combatants, the
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the
Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance,
the Ministry of Budget, the Ministry of Civil
Service, the PNC Inspector General, and two
civil society representatives. The international
community is represented by ambassadors and
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other diplomatic envoys involved in police reform
via ad hoc cooperation agreements or formal
expressions of intent.
The executive arm is responsible for technical
guidance and policy implementation, and is
composed of a secretariat and national experts
from the PNC, various ministries, civil society,
and international experts from the United
Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO,
formerly MONUC) and the European Union
Police. The secretariat was tasked with
conceptualising the reform and developing a
strategic action plan, with a particular emphasis
on implementing the PdP concept. 
The PdP concept is based on six key principles,
called the three ‘Ps’ and the three ‘Rs’ of
community policing: 
z Proximity, accessibility and availability of
public services through the de-concentration
of services.
z Partnership and consultation, making full use
of the population’s social and cultural capital,
civil society organisations, traditional leaders
and local security councils. 
z Prevention and victim support. In particular,
it offers outreach services to women and
children victims of violence.
z Resolving problems: PdP prioritises the
resolution of insecurity issues at local level. 
z Accountability (redevabilité) and transparency,
including putting mechanisms in place to
enable citizens to report cases of police abuse. 
z Respect for human rights is at the heart of the
PdP’s mission. 
The action plan for police reform and the PdP
approach have become key references for the
international community and present a clear
path of action for donor engagement. Police
practice based on the PdP concept tends to
attract most international funding, to the
detriment of the Minister of the Interior and
Security. International influence has weakened
the CSRP’s legitimacy in the eyes of national
agencies, with which they should be working
collaboratively.19 It is therefore ostracised from
national decision-making processes and is just
another structure within an extremely complex
web of agencies. It seems to operate outside
national control as a donor-led project, and even
the Minister of the Interior and Security has
marginalised it. The challenge now lies in
securing political buy-in for the CSRP and
acceptance of the reform process. 
3.12 The legislature: parliament’s role
The Congolese parliament is made up of two
chambers: the lower chamber (National
Assembly) and the upper chamber (Senate). A
bill must be submitted, examined and validated
by the Assembly before being submitted to the
Senate for a second reading and adoption. The
President then promulgates the new law. Both
chambers set up select committees concerned
with examining the bills and integrating
amendments before final validation by both
chambers. 
The police reform bill was introduced to, and
ratified by, the National Assembly in September
2009, after having been approved by the
Interministerial Governmental Commission.
Once in the Senate, however, the bill faced a
number of stumbling blocks, including:
z Police demilitarisation: this aspect of the bill
divided parliamentarians as demilitarisation
requires making changes to the Constitution.
Revising the Constitution20 is a prerequisite for
the reform process, but is also very sensitive. 
z Police cohesiveness. Articles 2 and 84 of the
bill include the merging of existing police
services (criminal justice police services,
border police, part of the DGM, and Interpol).
It did not, however, include the merging of
police services with regard to the security of
people and property, which was delegated to
the armed forces (Article 187 of the
constitution). A number of parliamentarians
thought it necessary to review these provisions. 
z Financial and administrative autonomy: a
number of parliamentarians opposed this
principle on the basis that the police are not a
legal entity and do not have any financial
assets.21
Because of these issues and the lack of support
from the higher echelons of power, the bill has
yet to be passed. The majority of
parliamentarians are members of l’Alliance pour
la Majorité Présidentielle (the Alliance for a
Presidential Majority, AMP) made up of le Parti
du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et le Développement
(the People’s Party for Reconstruction and
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Development, PPRD), Parti Lumumbiste (Lumuba
Party, PALU), l’Union des Démocrates Mobutistes
(Union of Mobutu Democrats, UDEMO),
l’Alliance pour la Reconstruction du Congo (the
Alliance for the Reconstruction of the Congo,
ARC) and other small political parties. They
tend to press on with reforms that have been
prioritised by the President, and delay those that
are thought to be a potential threat to the
government’s operations. Although the SSR
process stipulates that parliament should act as
a counter-power, it protects the interests of the
executive and the majority of parliamentarians.
In spite of these challenges, senators approved a
bill establishing the operations of the PNC on 15
April 2011.22 The bill was submitted for review to
a special mixed select committee (defence,
security, and sociocultural affairs), seconded by a
political, administrative and legal committee. It
proposes to separate the police force into an
administrative branch and a legal branch,
working with the judiciary to prosecute offences.
It also establishes five police structures: the
Superior Council, the General Commissionership,
the Inspectorate General, provincial police
stations, and territorial and local units. 
The CSRP officially welcomed this move as a
significant development in the PNC reform
process. However, the final document was a
watered-down version proposed initially, and is
considered by some to be a backward step
(N’zeka 2011). The law as it stands does not
include decisions agreed by civil society and
political leaders on integrating branches,
autonomy and organisational structures,
including for addressing such issues as gender-
based violence (Etinga 2011; N’zeka 2011).
The President must promulgate the law for it to
come into force. The most likely scenario is that
issues will continue to be debated whilst the
reform is being implemented. It will be
interesting to see how the new police service will
operate without the integration of the police
judiciaire des parquets and the police des frontières
(border police) within it, and how it will resolve
the issues of duplication, which are partly
responsible for its current problems. With regard
to the financial and administrative autonomy of
the police, experts agree that there is an inherent
contradiction between the very nature of the
police as a public service, and the refusal to treat
it as such by granting it the autonomy it requires.
One can also question how the police will address
important topical issues such as gender-based
violence and child protection, which have all been
left out of the current law but are central to the
police’s public service mission. 
3.13 The role of civil society: le Réseau de la Société
Civile pour la Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité et
Justice (Civil Society Network for the Reform of the
Security and Justice Sectors)23
Civil society has been increasingly involved in
the reform process since 2006, mostly through
the support of the international community. The
South African Non-Governmental Organisation
(NGO) Institute for Democracy in Africa
(IDASA) started working in the DRC, with
funding from DFID, with a view to strengthening
the involvement of civil society, parliament, the
media, and the population in the police reform
process. Other aspects of civil society
engagement included involvement in drafting
the police reform law, monitoring parliamentary
activity and supporting the reform’s
implementation, particularly the PdP.
DFID also supported IDASA and civil society
involvement by funding Redevabilité du Secteur de la
Sécurité et Réforme de la Police (Security Sector
Accountability and Police Reform – SSAPR
(SSAPR 2010a, b). 
Created in 2006 the Réseau pour la Réforme des
Services de Sécurité (Security Services Reform
Network, RRSS) managed to bring the issue of
security into the public domain, in spite of its
organisational weaknesses. The RRSS is
considered to be a credible alternative to
politicians, and the international community has
been supporting it. The RRSS is not the only civil
society actor involved in police reform. Despite
their organisational weaknesses and
fragmentation, the Chebeya case shows that
national civil society actors have risked their
lives24 in support of the reform process. 
4 Local and provincial actors: Bas-Congo case
study
The provincial breakdown of the security sector
adds to its complexity. Each province is host to a
number of decentralised services and
deconcentrated services with vague objectives,
which have to collaborate without a clear legal
framework. The case study of the organisation of
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the police in the Bas-Congo Province highlights
some of these challenges. 
The Bas-Congo, the smallest of the DRC’s 11
provinces, has existed since 1962. It is one of the
richest: thanks to its ideal location it benefits from
commercial, economic and agricultural assets.25
There are many instances of military interference
in civil justice cases, for example land disputes
between local communities, immigrant
communities and farmers, and customary disputes
(between clans). This deficient justice system and
insecurity issues are of little concern to the
authorities in Kinshasa, who do not supervise the
work of their agents in the field. However, they
were very concerned with the activities of the
former politico-religious movement Bundu dia
Kongo (BDK), which contributed to the
deterioration of the relationship between the
police and the population (see section 5.2 below).
4.1 Stakeholders involved in the security sector in the
Bas-Congo
The Provincial Governor is the central government
representative who coordinates the delivery of
deconcentrated public services at provincial level.
He/she is accountable to central government via
the Minister of the Interior and Security (Article
65 of the law on the administration of provinces).
The Governor protects national interests,
enforces the laws and regulations of the Republic,
and maintains security and public order (Article
63, ibid.). As the chief executive of the province,
he/she is responsible for the administration of all
public services.
The Governor of the Bas-Congo Province was
elected in January 2007 and governs with the
support of ten ministers, including a provincial
Minister for Security. In his capacity as
representative of the state and the representative
of the people of the province, the Governor is
both a decentralised and deconcentrated
authority. The Governor (a member of the
President’s party, the PPRD) was elected without
having secured the majority of parliamentary
seats. It is more than likely that he bought the
votes of members of the opposition.
The Provincial Assembly is made up of 29 deputies
who elect the Provincial Governor, approve the
provincial budget and control the executive. In
reality, assembly members lack the experience,
academic qualifications, motivation and
understanding to address public policy issues.
They are more concerned with supplementing
their meagre income by engaging in corrupt
practices, such as selling their votes to the
Governor.26 In this context it is difficult to see
how they can exercise any control over the
provincial government’s activities. 
The Provincial Minister of the Interior and Security is
responsible for maintaining public order,
ensuring public safety, protecting people and
their property, migration and border
surveillance, and immigration control. Provincial
ministers must all be natives of the province.
The current Minister of the Interior and Security
belongs to the presidential majority party. In
theory the Governor can delegate the supervision
and coordination of security services to the
Provincial Minister for Interior and Security, but
in reality the position holds very little power. In
the Bas-Congo, the Provincial Inspector is far
more influential than the Minister as he belongs
to a powerful network closely linked to the
President. 
In Bas-Congo and all other provinces, the
Provincial Inspector is responsible for the
coordination of deconcentrated police services
and accountable to the PNC Inspector General.
The Provincial Inspector commands, leads and
supervises all provincial police forces as per the
laws and regulations of the Republic. This
includes the management of human and
financial resources, and any buildings and
equipment at his disposal. He represents the
police force in his dealings with local authorities
and other parties. 
The Bas-Congo Provincial Inspector has close
ties to the General Inspectorate and the
President and therefore holds a key position in
the management of the province’s security
services. Although he is answerable to the
Provincial Governor, in reality he appears more
important. He played a key part in the repression
of Bundu Dia Kongo (‘the soul of the Congo’,
BDK) movement (see below), orchestrated by
the Minister of the Interior and Security and the
PNC General Inspectorate. The law states that
the national police force must submit to the local
authority under the responsibility of the Ministry
of Interior (Article 184 of the Constitution). In
practice however, provincial police forces answer
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to their own chain of command rather than the
local provincial authority. Despite allocating
considerable amounts of money to provincial
police services, the local authority does not
command the police but can requisition its
services. 
Field officers work in appalling conditions
(unsanitary housing and offices, meagre salaries,
dilapidated equipment, lack of decent food, bad
health care, etc.) and are often more concerned
with ensuring their own survival than complying
with regulations and respecting the chain of
command. Further, their numbers are
inadequate: there are 18 police stations in the
Bas-Congo Province, and 126 sub-stations. The
police/population ratio is 1/2317.27
As the representative of the government at
provincial level, the local authority should control
all services operating within its administrative
area, including the ANR and DGM, which both
have local and provincial representations. In
practice however, most services answer to their
own internal chain of command rather than the
local administrative authority. 
The Conseil Provincial de Sécurité (the Provincial
Security Council, or CPS) is an informal
structure that brings together all security and
justice agencies and centralises security-related
data at provincial level. There is no official
document prescribing the organisation of the
CPS and the management of the security sector
across all of the country’s provinces. The CPS
appears to be the logical incarnation of the CNS
at the provincial level but has no explicit legal
mandate.28 Decision-makers at province level
involved in the security and justice sectors are
members of the CPS (PNC, provincial Minister
of the Interior and Security, ANR, DGM,
FARDC, and judiciary). It is chaired by the
Governor, who convenes meetings on an ad hoc
basis. In the absence of a clear legal and
institutional framework, the Provincial Governor
is free to make unilateral decisions without any
stakeholder consultation or external scrutiny,
leading to poor policy implementation.
Nonetheless, the CSRP believes that the CPS is a
valuable and relevant body, which should be
revitalised and strengthened. It has therefore
been included in the new PdP structure and
incorporates civil society representatives. 
Various provincial agencies are cascaded down to
the local level. The mayor, the bourgmestre, the chef
de secteur and chef de chefferie are all local authorities
representing both the state and the province in
their respective jurisdictions. They are
responsible for the smooth running, coordination
and supervision of state and provincial services
and administrative operations (Article 93 and 94
of the law, Entité Territoriale Décentralisée
(Decentralised Territorial Entity, ETD)). The
Provincial Governor supervises all ETD activities
but can choose to delegate this responsibility to
the territorial administrator (Article 95). A
number of different local authority leaders have
the following responsibilities: 
z The mayor is involved in matters pertaining
to local security at city level and in doing so
can call upon police forces. The mayor must
inform the Governor of any significant event
taking place in the city and of any dispute or
conflict that is likely to threaten public order,
which will be escalated to the Minister of the
Interior and Security.
z As head of the local council, the bourgmestre is
involved in matters pertaining to security at
town/village level and can call upon local
police services to support the implementation
of these duties.
z The chef de secteur or sector chief is involved in
matters pertaining to security in a particular
secteur. 
z The chef de chefferie or chiefdom leader is the
local customary leader responsible for the
smooth running of his jurisdiction and
maintaining public order.
None of these local authority leaders are voted in
democratically; neither are they truly
autonomous as they retain strong institutional
links with central government. For example, the
bourgmestres and other local leaders are appointed
and dismissed by the central and/or provincial
administration. 
In some local areas religious and customary leaders
play a key role in conflict management and
peacekeeping. This is particularly true in rural
areas where customary leaders are granted
administrative authority and have developed
their own security systems and structures, thus
further complicating the implementation of new
policies and approaches. Villages and other small
towns have their own equivalent to the CPS,
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which operates without a clear mandate or legal
framework. 
4.2 Security management in the Bas-Congo
The case study of the Bas-Congo Province
highlights the confusion of roles and responsibilities
within the police service and the disproportionate
use of repressive measures. This casts real doubt
over the implementation of the PdP concept,
which forms the cornerstone of the reform
process backed by the international community. 
4.2.1 An institutional vacuum
The stakeholder mapping exercise carried out for
the purpose of this study does not give an accurate
picture of how security services really operate in
the DRC. In the Bas-Congo and all other
provinces, there is no ‘security sector’ as such, due
to the lack of coordination between services. In
the context of a flawed decentralisation process,
security services (police, ANR, DGM, FARDC,
and military and civilian justice services) at local
level operate independently and are often in
direct competition with one another.29 Security
services at provincial level refuse to come under
the helm of provincial authorities and remain
linked to central government.
Moreover, field agents within the different
security agencies are not fully aware of their
legal mandate and make up their own rules.
Civilians are also mostly unaware of the law and
their rights, making them more vulnerable to
abuse and easy to control. Most of the security
services’ funds and equipment come from the
provinces, with Kinshasa providing very little
support for salaries, equipment and training.
Consequently, agents at all levels are engaged in
a profitable system of extortion and racketeering
at the expense of the Congolese population and
with complete impunity (interviews with police
officers, 2010, 2011). 
Most conflicts between the population and the
police are the result of the police’s failure to
assist those in danger, the usurpation of power,
extortions, corruption, arbitrary arrests, illegal
detentions, etc. The historical evolution of the
police force is partly responsible for this
situation. During colonial rule, militia groups
were trained to tame, repress and punish those
who would not submit to the colonial authorities.
In return, the population are fearful and scornful
of security agents and the services they
represent. Citizens, mostly students, have
invented many nicknames for police officers
(interviews with students, 2010, 2011). 
In this operational vacuum, there is no control
over police activities. The Inspector General in
Kinshasa does not have the means to carry out
inspections or supervise what is happening in the
province. Through a system of patronage
networks, however, the authorities in Kinshasa
are able to exercise a degree of ‘control’ over the
distribution of power and wealth in the province
(interviews with police officers and other
members of the RRSS, 2010, 2011).
Thus, the authorities in Kinshasa do not
intervene in security matters that affect the
province unless their political and financial
interests are directly at stake. In the Bas-Congo,
the authorities collude with business interests in
a web of nepotistic networks that control a vast
swathe of the province’s resources. This
discriminatory practice writes many people out
of jobs and contributed to the rise of the famous
dissident movement Bundu dia Kongo (BDK). 
4.2.2 Repression of the Bundu Dia Kongo movement
The BDK movement constitutes the biggest
organised challenge to the Kinshasa regime in the
Bas-Congo. It combines religious and nationalist
agendas fuelled by a feeling of marginalisation
from central government and provincial
authorities (Katende and Bula Bula 2010). Since
2007 BDK have launched a series of strikes and
protests in Matadi and other cities, several of
which have led to both civilian and police
casualties. The police and soldiers have killed 104
people, while about 10 police have been killed.
The services involved in this operation of
‘restoring public order’ are: the President’s Office,
the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Kinshasa
Inspector General, and the Lower Congo
Inspector General. This essentially military core,
and belonging to the Katanga network, makes up
the main players in the management of security
issues at the highest level of the state.30
After the last, most deadly, episode between the
police and the BDK in 2008, relations between
the police and the population in the Bas-Congo
have deteriorated further. Those who came to
maintain public order ended up carrying out
hideous massacres which worked to irremediably
tarnish the image of security services, whose
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reputation was already poor. In light of this
repression of BDK followers – populations in the
Lower Congo – find it difficult to trust security
services. The catastrophic handling of the BDK
episode is illustrative of the dysfunctional nature
of different decision-making centres. It was clear
from this case that some national and provincial
decision-making centres, such as army
headquarters and the Provincial Governor, were
not well informed about the situation. 
5 Revisiting the PdP concept: an illusion?
It seems clear that the PdP concept, promoted by
donors through the CSRP, is not a priority for
various police divisions. The concept of
accountability, one of the basic principles
underlying the concept, must be effective in both
management processes and also shape the
behaviour of police officers. The establishment of
a community police force is supposed to be a
break away from the old practice of having a
militarised police, devoted to the maintenance of
governments and the protection of political
leaders, and thus aloof from the populations it is
supposed to protect. 
However, from the discussion above on
stakeholders, as well as the Bas-Congo case
study, it is clear that the thinking informing such
a practice in the DRC is far from being aligned
with the interests of actors within the police
sector. There is a clear lack of political will from
central authorities. Attention to police matters
only emerges when the personal safety of power-
holders and their different patronage networks is
concerned, and never when the security of the
population is at stake.
Those at the top of the political establishment
resist reform because it might well reduce their
‘powers’ and ability to loot. The promotion of a
‘community police’ is inextricably linked with
improved pay conditions and would have to go
through an audit of police numbers. This would
in effect end the use of fictitious employees
whose salaries help senior officers supplement
their own pay.31
Provincial and local authorities, devoid of any
real power, are less involved in the
implementation process. However, there are a
few encouraging initiatives which are worth
noting, especially local public discussion groups
and exchange fora (SSAPR 2011).
With regard to the national police, expectations
of officers are incongruent with what is proposed
under the ‘community policing’ approach. Lower
ranked officers welcomed the reform as it was
synonymous with improved socio-professional
conditions. The approach is summed up in these
terms, ‘Improve our socio-professional conditions
and we will provide better services as you
requested in your bill’. 
The context for implementation is also difficult,
including: a shortage of human resources; poor
coverage; difficulties relating to finance; the
absence of a coherent legal framework, and the
deficient management of resources. Besides, there
is also confusion surrounding the PdP concept.
Police officers think that it is a new unit, which
will be created from scratch. As far as donors are
concerned, the community police are not a new
unit, but rather a new way of doing things. 
One of the main problems associated with the
current reform is that it does not take into
account other important police units such as the
DGM, ANR and the police des parquets (police in
charge of criminal investigations). 
Civil society, particularly the RRSS, tends to
adhere to and promote the PdP concept, mainly
under the influence of international actors. The
involvement of civil society in matters of security
arouses suspicions of political manipulation by
international actors: the newly emerging civil
society struggles to remain objective and is
perceived as suspect by national authorities.
Customary authorities question the legitimacy of
civil society, and thus pay no heed to its advocacy
campaigns.
6 Conclusion
Stakeholders of the security and police sectors of
the DRC are linked together in a web of complex
and dynamic systems, characterised by the
discrepancies between theory and practice.
These interlocking and multifaceted systems are
in constant conflict and fuelled by power
relations, tacit agreements and collusions,
constraints and opportunism. It is inaccurate to
think of these systems and mechanisms as
working either in opposition to one another or in
parallel; these systems intertwine more than
they conflict. It is also worth noting that there
are significant overlaps and confusion with
regard to the mandates of the existing
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institutions, structures and actors involved. All
security services in the DRC possess a legal
framework within which they must operate. The
legal contradictions and loopholes identified here
are often the result of dubious interpretations, or
even deliberate misinterpretations of existing
operational provisions underlying the
functioning of security services. 
There is very poor coordination between national
and provincial actors, and the various
institutions involved. It is important to highlight
the shortcomings of a decentralisation process
which, when it comes to security services, lacks
effectiveness. Indeed, accountability processes in
the provinces show the reluctance of local
security services to answer to local authorities
and their continued dependence on central
government. This state of affairs between the
two levels of government creates a vacuum which
is quickly filled by various informal and socio-
professional networks. This creates a
dysfunctional structure characterised by a
culture of impunity, a semblance of autonomy
and independence among actors, but never with
regard to senior civil servants in charge of
coordination. Thus, issues only emerge when the
personal security of the incumbent is threatened,
rather than that of the general population. 
This is a chaotic system of governance, the survival
of which depends on corruption and on the
malleability of rules and actors. This intentional
fragmentation does not go hand in hand with such
concepts as ‘coordination and collaboration’, or
‘community policing’ promoted by international
partners. The result is the multifaceted provision
of security and justice services, characterised by
opportunism and open to manipulation and
exploitation at the population’s expense (RCN 2009).
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Notes
* Based on a paper translated from the French
original by Marie-Anne Diedhiou-Roy.
1 Widespread rioting began in Léopoldville
stemming from demands for self-government.
About 200 Congolese died in the rioting.
2 The 1966 reform splits the PNC into four
brigades: intervention, responsible for the
security of goods and people; investigation,
responsible for criminal investigations; special
intelligence; and the road and mobile brigade. 
3 The gendarmerie is also organised around
specialist brigades each with their own modus
operandi: special research and surveillance
brigades; road brigade; mobile brigade; air,
maritime and fluvial transport brigade; and
special child protection brigade.
4 This period was characterised by appalling
working conditions for the gendarmerie, leading
its agents to engage in frequent racketeering.
5 This body was well equipped with specialist
equipment such as truck-mounted water
cannons, tear gas, and lethal weapons. It was
formed of anti-terrorist, canine and marine
units. 
6 Informal interviews with stakeholders
involved in the police sector, provincial and
National Assembly members and the Senate
(Commission Politique Administrative et
Juridique (Legal Administrative Political
Affairs Committee – PAJ) commissions, and
defence and security commission). 
7 The CNS operates on the basis of four legal
documents: the Constitution of the Republic of
Zaïre, Articles 36 to 45; Decree-law n°79-047
dated 6 March 1970 stipulating the organisation
and operations of the CNS; Decree-law n°86-
036 dated 24 November 1986, revising and
modifying the previous decree; and Decree-law
n°87-032 dated 22 January 1987 stipulating its
internal rules and regulations. 
8 There are local denominations of the CNS in
provinces, towns, cities, territories and
districts across the DRC, known as provincial
or local security committees. 
9 The position of Special Advisor on security has
remained the same as during the CNS era. 
10 The Special Advisor on security comes from
the same Ngbandi ethnic group as Mobutu
and also belongs to a very financially powerful
group of mixed-raced Congolese, descended
from the white colonists. They were very
influential during the Mobutu era and quick
to re-form under Kabila’s son. This politico-
financial network benefits from the
considerable support of foreign business
sectors, the Europeans and the Americans
(World Bank, IMF, etc.) 
11 The entire Congolese population knows about
the influence of these informal networks, but
people hesitate to talk about them openly. 
12 There are a number of other influential
networks, but they are less present within the
military and the police. They include the
network of former AFDL members; the
Uganda-Ituri and Benyi-Butembo axes,
involved in mineral and oil extraction; the
Angolan axis, a political and military network
which controls oil and mineral extraction at
the western border of the DRC; the Maniema
axis, also a political and military network,
made up of generals and politicians that have
held or currently hold ministerial positions;
and the Bas-Congo axis, centred on the
President’s wife and her affiliation to the
Yombe ethnic group. 
13 There is hope that a new law will strengthen
the CSPN. Article 22 on the organisation of the
police established the CSPN as a consultative
body working with the General
Commissionership (commanding and
implementing body) and the General Police
Inspectorate (control body). The CSPN would
develop a code of conduct for the police corps,
take part in developing a criminal policy and
monitor its implementation within the ministry. 
14 This provision refers to Article 184 of the 2006
Constitution, according to which ‘the police
answer to local authorities, under the overall
responsibility of the Ministry of Interior’. 
15 The Inspector General controls an anti-
terrorist battalion called Simba. This
battalion is an autonomous unit, almost like a
‘police force within the police’, made up of
forces loyal to the Inspector General. It is
better equipped than the police and the army,
and is widely feared. It is responsible for the
reprisals against the Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)
in the Bas-Congo province.
16 Its headquarters used to be in Kin Mazière, in
the centre of Kinshasa. These services are
currently located within the General
Inspectorate, in the town of Lingwala, in front
of the Palais du Peuple (People’s Palace). The
Inspectorate houses a detention centre and
the service can arrest and detain civilians for
political reasons. 
17 Testimonies from Congolese citizens.
18 The Congolese judiciary is organised
according to decree-law n°82/020. The 2006
Constitution splits the former Supreme Court
into three separate jurisdictional orders (the
Constitutional court, the State Council and
the Supreme Court of Judicature) and new
jurisdictions (work, commerce and
administrative tribunals). 
19 The EU and the MONUC/MONUSCO are
the main agencies involved in this structure,
even though other stakeholders are also
formally involved from time to time. 
20 The state supplies the police with equipment
and other infrastructure it needs to operate. 
21 We would like to thank A.G.R. Nkata,
consultant for the EA-SSAPR, for clarifying
this section. 
22 Sixty-three voted in favour of the law, none
voted against and three abstained.
23 My sincere thanks to the RRSS team and the
EA-SSAPR project for including me in the
RRSS evaluation and enabling me to collect
this information. 
24 Many journalists and religious leaders have
been killed for speaking up for the rights of
the vulnerable (Floribert Chebeya, human
rights activist; journalists Franck Gykie from
Référence Plus; Papua Muamba from Phare,
Kinshasa; Serge Maheshe and Didas
Namushimba from Radio Okapi Bikavu,
Kinshasa; bishops Muzirwa and Kataliko,
Bukavu, and others.). 
25 According to DGM statistics, from January to
December 2009, 9,213 Congolese were sent
back from Angola (5,630 men, 2,966 women,
618 children). Between 6 October and
11 December 2009, 624 Angolans were sent
back from the DRC (289 men, 216 women and
119 children) (DRC 2009).
26 In practice, provincial parliamentarians often
sell their votes to the most generous buyer, as
was the case in Kinshasa and the provinces of
Equateur, Occidental and Oriental Kasai. 
27 This ratio relates to the city of Matadi and is
far from the internationally accepted ratio of
one policeman for 300 inhabitants.
28 Based on M. Loochi Kizoungu’s working
notes. The working notes are based on five
legal documents that could partly justify the
existence and operations of the CPS. Loochi is
a member of RRSS (South Kivu).
29 There are numerous conflicts between the ANR,
the PNC and the DGM at the port of Matadi,
where many customs transactions take place.
Security agents act as protectors or facilitators
and charge a fee for their services. This leads to
conflicts between agencies, the loss of income
for customs services, and the illicit accumulation
of wealth of security officials. The government
tries to address this by reducing the number
of agencies allowed to work at the port, but
the excluded agencies never stay away and
corruption continues unabated. 
30 For more on the Bundu Dia Kongo episode, see
the report, We will Crush You by Human Rights
Watch (2008).
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31 Besides its relatively small influence on the
police, the Minister of the Interior and Security
is largely thwarted by presidential services and
the Inspector General. Ministry of Interior and
Security staff are inexperienced and the
Ministry lacks capacity to deal with security
matters in-country. The changes brought about
by the reform of the police, and particularly the
introduction of community policing, require a
strong political and strategic vision, as well as
institutional restructuring and changes in day-
to-day work processes.
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